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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Travis 0. Pena appeals from the Order For Restitution entered after he 
pied guilty to and received a withheld judgment for felony eluding a law 
enforcement officer. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 10, 2010, law enforcement officers responded to a report that 
Pena "was intoxicated and out of control, and was striking people" at a residence 
in Kamiah, Idaho. (PSI, pp.1, 15, 18;1 also 10/13/10 Tr., p.6, L.15 - p.7, 
L.12.) When officers approached the residence, Pena fled in a pickup truck. 
(PSI, pp.1-2, 15, 18; 10/13/10 Tr., p.7, L.19 - p.8, L.1.) A high-speed chase 
ensued, during which Pena ran numerous stop signs, crashed through metal 
stock gates, drove straight at and narrowly missed hitting two patrol vehicles, and 
almost hit a different patrol vehicle "head-on." (PSI, pp.2, 15-16, 18-19; 10/13/10 
Tr., p.8, L.7 - p.11, L.25.) Ultimately, Pena drove the pickup at a high rate of 
speed up a "goat trail," which "was reported to be a narrow, unmaintained dirt 
road with deep ruts, a high center, running ground water, and overgrown brush 
hanging out into the pathway." (PSI, pp.2, 16, 19.) An officer attempted to 
pursue Pena on the "goat trail" but "his patrol vehicle stopped abruptly, sank into 
a deep hole, and got stuck," causing damage to the vehicle's radiator and 
cooling fan. (PSI, pp.2, 16, 19, 24; see also 10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-17.) The 
1 Unnumbered pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively, 
beginning at page 12. 
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vehicle had to be towed and cost a total of $869.38 to repair. (PSI, pp.2-3, 24; 
R, p.21; 10/13/10Tr., p.13, L.9-p.15, L.1.) 
The state charged Pena with felony eluding a law enforcement officer. 
(R., pp.9-10.) Pena pied guilty (R., p.14), and the district court withheld 
judgment and placed Pena on probation for five years (R., pp.24-27). Following 
a restitution hearing, the district court entered an order requiring Pena to pay 
restitution in the amount of $1,055.91. (R., pp.28-30.) Of that amount, $869.38 
represented the amount it cost the Lewis County Sheriff's Office to have the 
damaged patrol vehicle repaired. (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.9; also 




Pena states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in ordering Mr. Pena to pay $1,055.91 in 
restitution? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




The State Presented Substantial Competent Evidence To Support The 
Restitution Award 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Pena to pay restitution in the amount of $869.38 
for costs associated with the repair of the damaged patrol vehicle. (10/13/10 Tr., 
p.20, L.21 - p.21, L.5.) On appeal, Pena is "[m]indful that the State presented 
substantial evidence that the patrol vehicle was damaged during the commission 
of the eluding charge." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) He contends, however, that the 
pursuing officer assumed the risk that the patrol vehicle would be damaged when 
he followed Pena up the dirt road and, as such, Pena should not be required to 
"shoulder[] the whole damage." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Pena's argument is 
without merit. A review of the record and the applicable law supports the district 
court's determination that the damage to the patrol vehicle was caused by 
Pena's criminal conduct and, as such, Pena is responsible for the full amount of 
economic loss associated with the repair of that vehicle. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 
752 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. 
App. 2008); In Re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if 
supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280. 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That The 
Damage To The Patrol Vehicle Was Caused By Pena's Criminal Conduct 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" 
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result 
of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... resulting from the criminal conduct." 
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore, in order for restitution to be 
appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which 
the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim." State v. 
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398,401 (2011). 
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of 
actual cause and true proximate cause." kl (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 
367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). The court articulated the distinction 
between actual and proximate cause as follows: 
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 
223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 
204 P .3d 508, 515 (2009)]). The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two 
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the 
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
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negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so 
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting 
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also State v. Cottrell,_ P.3d 
_, 2012 WL 386594, *3 (Idaho App., Feb. 8, 2012) (remittitur issued March 3, 
2012). The determinations of actual cause and proximate cause are both factual 
questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell,_ P.3d at_, 
2012 WL 386594, *3. 
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Corbus 
court upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when he 
jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 602-
06, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the court found that, but for "Corbus' acts 
of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in 
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed 
to" jump from the vehicle. kl at 603, 249 P .3d at 402. The court also found 
proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus 
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at 
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably 
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a 
potentially serious car accident." k!_. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404. 
More recently, in Cottrell, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an 
award of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained 
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when he attempted to restrain Cottrell white Cottrell actively resisted and 
obstructed the officer's attempt to arrest him. P.3d at 2012 WL 386594 
at *2-5. The court concluded that actual cause was "satisfied because the 
evidence show[ed] it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to pull away from [the 
officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain control of 
Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee." lih at _, 2012 WL 386594 at *4 
(footnote omitted). The court also found proximate cause, reasoning it was 
reasonably foreseeable, based on Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the 
officer's requests and submit to arrest, "that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a 
physical response from [the officer], putting [the officer] in a position to injure his 
knee." lih at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5. 
As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing in this case supports the district court's award of restitution 
and, more specifically, its finding that the damage to the patrol vehicle was 
caused by Pena's criminal conduct. While the district court did not specifically 
use the words "actual cause," it did find that the officer would not have been 
pursuing Pena, and thus would not have "been at the mud hole" that damaged 
the patrol vehicle, "but for" Pena's eluding conduct. (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-
17.) This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Lewis County Sheriff 
Brian Brokop testified that, when law enforcement officers responded to the 
report of a disturbance at a residence, Pena fled from the residence in a pickup 
truck, travelled at high rates of speed on icy roads, ignored officers' sirens and 
emergency lights, crashed through metal gates, drove directly at and narrowly 
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missed hitting two patrol verlicles, and almost collided "head-on" with another 
patrol vehicle driven by Deputy John Hescock. (10/13/10 Tr., p.6, L.1 - p.11, 
L.25.) After Pena nearly hit him, Deputy Hescock pursued Pena "up a dirt road 
that had very deep mud holes in it." (10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15.) It was during 
that pursuit that the "patrol vehicle ended up getting stuck in one of the mud 
holes, which caused damage to the vehicle." (10/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-17.) 
This evidence shows that, were it not for Pena's acts of driving recklessly, 
eluding police officers and failing to stop in response to their emergency lights 
and sirens, Deputy Hescock would never have driven up the dirt road and gotten 
stuck in the mud hole that caused damage to the patrol vehicle. Actual cause is 
thus satisfied in this case. 
There is also substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that 
Pena's criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the patrol 
vehicle. During his argument at the conclusion of the restitution hearing, defense 
counsel argued that Pena should not be held responsible for the full amount of 
restitution because, by following Pena up the dirt road, Deputy Hescock 
unreasonably assumed the risk that his patrol vehicle might be damaged. 
(10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-9.) The district court rejected this argument, concluding 
that Pena had a duty to stop and, given his failure to do so, the pursuit by Deputy 
Hescock "was certainly permissible if not required." (10/13/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-
15.) The district court was correct. The evidence unequivocally shows that, in 
an attempt to elude the officers, Pena ignored the officers' lights and sirens and 
drove extremely recklessly, endangering both life and property. (10/13/10 Tr., 
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p.6, L.1 - p.11, L.25, p.12, Ls.11-15.) Given Pena's eluding conduct, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that Deputy Hescock, an officer charged with upholding 
and enforcing the law, would pursue Pena up the dirt road where the patrol 
vehicle was ultimately damaged. (See 10/13/10 Tr., p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.2 
(testimony that "Deputy Hescock was attempting to carry out the duties of his 
office as he followed that pickup up that road").) 
Pena does not seriously contend that the evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing does not support a finding that his criminal conduct was both 
the actual and proximate cause of the damage to the patrol vehicle. In fact, 
Pena does not even mention the words "actual cause" or "proximate cause" in 
his Appellant's brief, nor does he cite Corbus, supra, or any other case that 
actually pertains to the issue of causation. Instead, he contends in wholly 
conclusory fashion that the state "failed to present substantial evidence that all of 
the damage caused was the result of Mr. Pena's criminal activity" because, as 
argued by defense counsel below, the officer unreasonably assumed the risk 
that the patrol vehicle might be damaged when he followed Pena up the dirt 
road. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5.) This argument is not only unsupported by 
citation to any legal authority, it is also nearly identical to arguments specifically 
considered and rejected by the Idaho appellate courts in Corbus and Cottrell, 
supra. In both cases, the defendants argued that the victims did not have to take 
the actions that resulted in their injuries. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 605-06, 249 P.3d 
at 404-05; Cottrell,_ P.3d at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5. As explained by the 
court in Cottrell, however, the fact that a victim chooses to take a particular 
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course of action in response to the defendant's criminal conduct is not itself a 
basis for relieving the defendant of liability for the victim's injuries: 
It is no defense to say Officer Sullivan did not have to tackle 
Cottrell any more than it was a defense in Corbus to say that the 
passenger did not have to jump out of the vehicle - an argument 
that was put forward and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
This argument is more accurately an attempt to point to an 
intervening cause, meaning a voluntary act by another that breaks 
the causal chain. [Corbus, 150 Idaho] at 602, 605, 249 P.3d at 
401, 404. To break the causal chain, though, requires that the 
victim's conduct was unforeseeable and an extraordinary 
occurrence. Id. at 606, 249 P .3d at 405. Cottrell makes no 
argument that Officer Sullivan's reaction was excessive, 
extraordinary, or unreasonable. The record shows that Cottrell 
repeatedly dismissed Officer Sullivan's requests for Cottrell to 
cooperate and submit to arrest. It was only after Cottrell continued 
to evade Officer Sullivan that Officer Sullivan took actions to control 
Cottrell. Therefore, it was foreseeable that Cottrell's conduct would 
elicit a physical response from Officer Sullivan, putting Officer 
Sullivan in a position to injure his knee. 
Cottrell,_ P.3d at_, 2012 WL 386594 at *5. 
Like the arguments in Corbus and Cottrell, Pena's argument that Deputy 
Hescock assumed the risk of injury is really a claim that Deputy Hescock 
performed a voluntary act that broke the causal chain between Pena's criminal 
conduct and the damage that ultimately resulted to the patrol vehicle. As 
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Corbus, however, "[g]enerally, the 
contributory negligence of the victim is not enough to relieve the defendant of 
criminal liability." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405 (citing State v. 
Taylor, 67 Idaho 313, 316, 177 P.2d 468, 470 (1947)). Rather, to be relieved of 
liability for the victim's injuries the victim's conduct must have been an 
"unforeseeable and an extraordinary occurrence." Cottrell, _ P.3d at _, 
2012 WL 386594 at *5 (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405). As in 
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Corbus and Cottrell, such is not the case here. Deputy Hescock is a law 
enforcement officer whose duty it is to enforce and uphold the law. Given the 
dangerous manner in which Pena was driving and his eluding behavior, it was 
not only reasonably foreseeable, but also entirely expected, that Deputy Hescock 
would pursue him. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (officer's pursuit and 
use of force to apprehend fleeing motorist was reasonable and necessary to 
protect human life). 
Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the damage 
to the patrol vehicle was caused by Pena's criminal conduct. Pena has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion in the restitution award. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Order Withholding 
Judgment and Imposing Probation and the Order for Restitution. 
DATED this 23rd day of March 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of March 2012, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/pm 
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